The Missouri Court of Appeals recently upheld a trial court's ruling that an occupational disease does not fall within the exclusivity provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Code. In KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook, WD73462 (Mo.Ct.App.2011), the Court held that the WC exclusivity provisions apply only to accidents in the workplace. An accident is defined by the Missouri Code as an "unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift." Since the Missouri WC exclusivity provisions are only applicable to accidents, and occupational diseases do not fall within the Code's definition of accidents, the Court held that an employee could seek recovery for an occupational disease under WC or common law.

My Two Cents:

This issue will not likely ever raise its ugly head in Alabama due to the language in the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Code. Ala. Code Sections 25-5-52 and 25-5-53 specifically incorporate occupational diseases into the Workers' Compensation Code's exclusivity provisions. Therefore, whether the injury is the result of an accident or occupational disease, the exclusivity provision of the Alabama Worker’s Compensation Code would apply.

Williams v. Valley View Health and Rehabilitation, LLC

On September 10, 2010, the Court of Appeals released this opinion wherein it reversed the Trial Court’s grating of Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant, stating that the Court should have considered the new legal argument in post-judgment motion that asthma attack due to a one time exposure to chemicals was an accidental injury.

The plaintiff provided adequate notice for an accidental injury and the complaint said she suffered injury due to an incident. The defendant filed for Summary Judgment arguing it was not an occupational disease. The plaintiff responded and said it was an occupational disease and even filed her own Motion for Summary Judgment that the injury was an occupational disease. The Trial Court granted the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, stating it was not an occupational disease. At that point, the plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion stating that she never filed an occupational disease claim and that the Trial Court should consider the claim that she sustained an accidental injury. Considering a new legal argument is within the Trial Court’s discretion and not to be reversed unless they exceeded that discretion. Based on this right, the Trial Court denied the post-judgment motion.

The majority focused on the fact that case law has always treated asthma attacks and similar conditions due to a one-time exposure as accidental injuries, in addition to the plaintiff providing notice as required for accidental injuries. Furthermore, it stated that there was no assertion that her asthma was due to long-term exposure, which is required for an occupational disease. Based on this, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Trial Court should have consider the new argument because her entire claim should not be foreclosed because the accidental injury claim was not considered.

My Two Cents:

Since the burden of proof for proving an accidental injury is lower that an occupational disease due to continuous exposure, it is important to identify early on whether or not the claimant is claiming accidental versus non-accidental exposure.

Robert Cocking v. City of Montgomery:

On March 12, 2010, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals considered the issue of whether Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") was compensable as an occupational disease in the absence of a physical injury. In the discovery phase, it was learned that the plaintiff was a Montgomery firefighter for 25 years. In his capacity as a firefighter, he was often called upon to respond to emergency situations. On October 3, 2005, the plaintiff failed to revive a two and a half year old baby. On June 29, 2008, he failed to revive a 52 year old woman. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the continuos exposure to such stressful situations caused him to develop PTSD. The employer filed and argued a motion for summary judgment based on the fact that there was no evidence of a physical injury. In Alabama, there must be physical injury in order for a mental injury to be compensable. The plaintiff conceded that there was no physical injury but argued that there was no such requirement if the mental injury was an occupational disease. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and the employee appealed the decision. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals considered the briefs and heard oral argument on the issue. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision. In support of its decision, the Court noted that the statute defining an occupational disease specifically refers to physical diseases. As such, in order for a mental disease to qualify, it would need to meet the same physical injury requirement as an accidental injury.

My Two Cents:

This is not the first time this argument has been made. However, in prior cases, the Court of Civil Appeals decided in favor of the employer because the plaintiff did not have job duties peculiar to his or her employment that could possibly cause PTSD. This always left open the possibility that the Court could determine in a subsequent case that PTSD was an occupational disease if the plaintiff could prove his or her job duties could cause the disorder. This issue has now been resolved and the physical injury requirement remains intact even when an occupational disease is alleged.

 

Greater Mobile Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Charles Atterberry:

In this opinion released on December 19, 2008, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals considered an employee’s claim of occupational disease. At trial, the employee presented evidence that his interstitial lung disease and adult respiratory distress syndrome was caused by exposure to chemicals at work. the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the limited issue of compensability. The plaintiff had not yet reached MMI and so the issue of disability remained open. Although the employer initially filed a petition for writ of mandamus, it was converted and treated as a timely appeal. In reversing the trial court’s finding of compensability, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the employee failed to identify the necessary causal link between his condition and the chemical exposure for his condition to be considered an occupational disease. The Court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered a non-accidental injury because he could not prove that he was exposed to chemicals materially in excess of what ordinary people are exposed to in their everyday lives.